1.5°C

Ambitious NDC 3.0
Roadmap for FF Phaseout
Robust GGA Indicators
Means of Implementation
GST Outcome Implementation
Article 9.1 Implementation
Permanent L&D Agenda
L&D Gap Report

CLIMATE JUSTICE

30th CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES

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ARTICULATING CSOs POSITION TOGETHER

CLIMATE JUSTICE ALLIANCE BANGLADESH

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Secretariat:
Center for Participatory Research and Development–CPRD
House 1219, Road 10, Avenue 10, Mirpur DOHS, Dhaka 1216
Email: info@cprdbd.org Web: www.cprdbd.org

WRITTEN BY
Sheikh Nur Ataya Rabbi, Md Shamsuddoha, Sumaiya Binte Anwar, Shahnawaz Whara, Nazmul Ahsan, Mrityunjoy Das, Farah Anjum, Tanje-Un-Jenat, Elmee Tabassum, Shohanur Rahman, Jiniya Afroze, PhD, Partha Hefaz Shaikh, Shanjia Shams, Rabeya Begum, Sufia Khanam, PhD, Nushrat Rahman Chowdhury, Mohammad Mahmodul Hasan, Md. Ahsanul Wahed, Mohammad Shahjahan, Farhana Afroz, Shekhar Chakraborty, Md. Moniruzzaman, Afsari Begum, Al Imran, H. M. Rayhanul Islam, Rai Dhar Ruchi.

CONTRIBUTED BY
Rahima Sultana Kazal, AVAS; Babul Shaikh, and Shekh Mohiuddin, Action Against Hunger-ACF; AHM Bazlur Rahman, Bangladesh NGOs Network for Radio and Communication; Muhammad Borhan Uddin, Bangladesh Red Crescent Society (BDRCS); Fariha Sultana Aumi, Brighters; M. Shajjat Hossain, CBM Global Disability Inclusion; Adibur Rahman, Centre for Climate Justice Bangladesh; Md. Abul Hasan, COAST Foundation; Mohammed Nabinur Rahman, Concern Worldwide; Mir Mehoraf Sharif, and Nafis Imtiaj Hossain, CPRD; Zobair Hasan, DORP; Abu Saly Md. Sabur, and Shameema Akhter Shimul, Enfants du Monde (EdM); Md. Masukul Haque Masuk, ESDO; Faria Hossain Ikra, Greenpeace South East Asia; Tasnim Rahman, Global One; Ratul Dev, GenLab; Asim Kumar Roy, HEKS/ EPER; Madiha Chowdhury, Helvetas Bangladesh; AM Nasir Uddin, and Md. Anwar Hossain, Islamic Relief Bangladesh; Salauddin Ahmed, Jamuna TV; Md. Harun-or-Rashid, and Wahida Easmin, Light House; Shoma Datta, Manusher Jonno Foundation; Farhan Hossain Joy, Nagorik Uddyog; Sk. Zakir Hossain, NETZ Bangladesh; Nishat Tasnim, Practical Action; Md Nashir Uddin Faruq, Shushilan; Mostofa Mujahid, Terre des Hommes; Ikbal Faruk, Waterkeepers Bangladesh; Farid Ahmed, Women Development Program; Yudhishtir Chandra Biswas, and Jesmima Sabatina, Young Climate Action Network–YOUCAN.

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DECLARATION
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CLIMATE JUSTICE

30th CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES

ARTICULATING CSOs POSITION TOGETHER

HIGHLIGHTS

MITIGATION

- Deliver clear roadmaps for fossil fuel phaseout and tripling global renewable energy capacity and doubling global energy efficiency improvement by 2030.
- Require Parties to update their NDC 3.0 with bold, transformative, accountable, and 1.5° C-aligned mitigation targets, in the light of CBDR-RC.
- Ensure outcome-oriented renewed effort under the Mitigation Work Programme (MWP), including sectoral (energy, transport, industry, AFOLU) 2030 mitigation efforts aligned with 1.5° C.

ADAPTATION

- Deliver a robust scientific, comprehensive, and practical indicator framework for measuring the progress towards achieving the GGA, underpinned by adequate MOI.
- Institutionalize Locally Led Adaptation and ensure local communities have access to the necessary finance to implement it effectively.
- Clarify the scope, modalities, timelines, and institutional mechanisms under the Baku Adaptation Roadmap (BAR).
- Ensure means of implementation (MoI) for formulation and implementation of National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) in the developing countries.
- Agree on a new adaptation finance commitment to ensure that adaptation progress at COP30 is more than just a MEL exercise.

LOSS AND DAMAGE

- Establish a permanent agenda item on Loss and Damage and a sub-goal for L&D finance under NCQG, excluding humanitarian/emergency response funds.
- Mandate to launch a global, scientific assessment of loss and damage and build human rights-based institutions and approaches.
- Expedite SNLD Advisory Board's efforts in catalyzing technical assistance requests and strengthen collaboration of SNLD with the ExCom and FRLD.

CLIMATE FINANCE

- Establish Article 9.1 of the PA as a standalone agenda, reaffirm developed countries' legal financial obligation to provide new, additional, predictable and grant-based climate finance, and ensure its transparent and accountable implementation.
- Ensure the Baku to Belem Roadmap to 1.3T provide clear and comprehensive, transparent, accountable and justice-based trajectory, milestones, modalities, and institutional mechanisms, and political signals for financing adequate climate actions.
- Ensure international financial systems reform, focusing on reducing the cost of capital and repayment burden, enhancing access, increasing concessional and non-debt finance, and aligning resources with the climate priorities of developing countries.
- Ensure Article 2.1(c) mandate focuses on both increasing climate-aligned finance and reducing climate-harming flows and deliver a shift from dialogue to action under it.

GLOBAL STOCKTAKE

- Translate GST-1 outcomes into Action ensuring equity and CBDR-RC and define modalities of the UAE Dialogue.

JUST TRANSITION

- Establish an action mechanism for 1.5°C aligned, rights-based, inclusive, and holistic just transition with provision of adequate MOI, which is guided by historical responsibility. Ensure a robust MEL system for tracking implementation of the Just Transition Work Programme (JTWP).

GENDER AND CLIMATE CHANGE

- Ensure adoption of an ambitious, inclusive, transformative and actionable Gender Action Plan with robust financial and technical support.
- Deliver gender-related indicators for all GGA targets, including for MOI.

INDIGENOUS PEOPLES

- Ensure free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) and respect for Indigenous Peoples' rights.
- Ensure protection and utilization of indigenous knowledge & governance and effective role and contribution of the indigenous and local communities.

YOUTH, CHILDREN, AND PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES

- Address distinct vulnerabilities of the youth, children, and persons with disabilities in the climate change policy and planning and ensure their effective inclusion in climate negotiation and national policy cycle.
- Operationalize policies, technical assistance and finance to address economic and non-economic loss and damage faced by the youth, children, and persons with disabilities.

HUMAN RIGHTS AND HEALTH

- Establish a legal institutional framework under the UNFCCC to protect human rights against climate change impacts.
- Launch a work program to establish a climate-resilient health surveillance system that integrates structural measures with non-structural measures to monitor, prevent, and respond effectively to climate-induced health risks.
- Integrate health co-benefit in the national climate policies, with particular attention to addressing disproportionate health burdens and building reproductive health resilience.

DISPLACEMENT AND MIGRATION

- Establish a clear and actionable definition of climate change-induced migration and displacement and strengthen efforts under WIM to address climate induced human mobility.

BIODIVERSITY, FOREST, FOOD SYSTEM

- Ensure a political outcome to implement the GST-1 commitment to halt and reverse deforestation by 2030.
- Establish a dedicated funding arrangement for supporting conservation of tropical forests.
- Incorporate food systems transformation as a central strategy within the UNFCCC framework to effectively halt and reverse deforestation.

UNFCCC

THE FRAMEWORK WHICH THE NEGOTIATION BUILDS ON

The political discussion for addressing human-induced climate change began in 1988 at the United Nations General Assembly, which adopted a resolution 43/53 calling the Member States to take necessary and timely actions to deal with climate change within a global framework (UNGA, 1988). The same year, the United Nations (UN) established an Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) to assess the magnitude, estimate impacts, and propose strategies for responding to climate change. The IPCC's first assessment report in 1990 confirmed 'human activities' as fundamental causes of the unprecedented rise in global average temperature, compared to the pre-industrial levels, and recommended global political directives to address and revert from the crisis (IPCC, 1990). In the same year, The UN General Assembly noted the IPCC's findings as a serious concern and established an Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Framework Convention on Climate Change (INC) (UNGA,1990). The INC's framework convention came to be known as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and got wider political acceptance with an endorsement by 158 countries at the UN's Rio Conference in Brazil in 1992. The Convention entered into force on 21 March 1994 and became the universal one currently with 197 Parties.

The Convention sets its ultimate objective (Article 2) "to achieve, ...

stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic [originating in human activity] interference with the climate system".

BOX 1: UNFCCC Principles for Addressing Climate Change

- Protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future generations of humankind on the basis of equity and in accordance with common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities of the Parties. This requires the developed country Parties to take the lead in combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof;
- Provide full consideration to the specific needs and special circumstances of developing country Parties, especially those that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change, and would have to bear a disproportionate or abnormal burden;
- Take precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent or minimize the causes of climate change and mitigate its adverse effects. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing such measures;
- Integrate required measures to protect the climate system into national development programmes while also promoting sustainable development and not compromising economic development, which is essential for adopting measures to address climate change; and
- Cooperate and promote a supportive and open international economic system that would lead to sustainable economic growth and development in all Parties, particularly developing country Parties, thus enabling them to better address the problems of climate change.

Note: Adapted from the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UN 1992)

The Convention emphasizes achieving emission-cap limits within a time-frame, which would allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, ensure that food production is not threatened, and enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner. The Convention notes that the largest share of historical and current global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions originated in the developed countries and provided an incremental space in the share of future emission scenarios for the developing countries to continue economic growth and to meet their social and development needs.

To achieve its objective, the Convention sets five principles (Box 1) to guide the Parties in deciding and implementing climate actions, requiring the developed countries to take the lead on both fronts, e.g., limiting and reversing global emissions and the consequent impacts. The Convention requires the country Parties on a category basis to act in conformity with an overarching principle of "common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR-RC)" while addressing the climate crisis.

Working out this commitment's extent, modalities, and dimensions, the Convention established a supreme authority of the country Parties under 'Conference of the Parties (COP)' to make decisions on implementing activities aligned with its ultimate goal and in accordance with its principles. To date, the Conference of the Parties has succeeded in yielding two agreements, namely the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement.

The Kyoto Protocol, adopted at COP 3 in 1997, made the industrialized countries and the countries in transition (known as Annex I parties under the UNFCCC) legally bound to reduce economy-wide GHGs emissions by an average of 5 percent below 1990 levels in 2008- 2012, with specific targets varying from country to country based on both nationally originated and a market-based mechanisms (UNFCCC, 1998).

On the other hand, the Paris Agreement, adopted at COP 21 in 2015, required all the Parties to contribute to the emission reduction with progressively scaled-up targets communicated by their nationally determined contributions– NDCs, coherent with limiting the global average temperature rise to well below 2°C, preferably to 1.5°C, compared to the pre-industrial level. The agreement also provided a framework for financial, technical, and capacity-building support from the developed countries to the developing ones to implement activities towards mitigation, adaptation, and addressing losses and damages (L&Ds) (UNFCCC, 2016).

The agreement was hailed for its inclusiveness and setting a legally binding target of limiting global average temperature rise, while also being criticized for the flexibility it provided to the country Parties to determine their emission reduction 'contributions' (in lieu of 'commitments') voluntarily and considering the national circumstances (in lieu of 'respective capabilities'). Such flexibility, arguably, is helping the historical emitters and the currently big emitters to evade one of the key principles of addressing climate change--equity and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities.

THE PARIS AGREEMENT

KEY ELEMENTS

The Paris Agreement charts a new course, comprising three basic elements, e.g., mitigation, adaptation, and Loss and Damage (L&D) to address climate change. Yet, the key aspect of addressing climate change, as emphasized by Article 2 of the Agreement, is limiting global average warming to well below 2° Celsius above the preindustrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit temperature rise to 1.5° Celsius by the end of this century.

Article 3 requires the Parties to undertake and communicate ambitious mitigation efforts as nationally determined contributions (NDCs) to the global response to climate change, recognizing that the developing country Parties need support for the effective implementation of the Agreement.

Article 4 of the PA requires the countries to reach the 'global peaking' of GHGs at the soonest and achieve 'carbon neutrality' in the second half of this century through: i) deeper cut of the anthropogenic emissions and ii) removing/trapping GHGs by sinks and reservoirs.

On anthropogenic emission reduction, Article 4 establishes binding commitments by all the Parties to domestically undertake progressive mitigation actions communicated by their NDCs every five years. Aligning with the Convention's CBDR-RC principle, the Agreement directs the developed countries to take the lead in mitigation efforts by undertaking absolute economy-wide emission reduction targets and the developing countries to continue enhancing their mitigation efforts. Parties are also encouraged to conserve and enhance sinks and reservoirs, e.g., forests, wetlands, etc., to complement the mitigation efforts.

To encourage higher mitigation efforts through voluntary cooperation among/between the Parties, the PA introduces two different measures, namely: i) market-based mechanism and b) nonmarket approaches and sets out the principles for environmental integrity under Article 6.

On adaptation actions, the Paris Agreement establishes a 'Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA)', under Article 7, that aims to significantly strengthen national adaptation efforts. It also required all the countries to develop country-specific National Adaptation Plans (NAP) and periodically update their implementation through adaptation communications.

The Agreement includes a standalone article– Article 8– that emphasizes averting, minimizing, and addressing loss and damages (L&Ds) resulting from extreme and slow onset events and requires the Parties to enhance understanding, action, and support, usually through the WIM, to address climate-induced L&Ds in developing countries.

On finance, Article 9 of the Agreement makes the developed countries obligated to support the developing countries' mitigation and adaptation efforts in a balanced manner. It also decides that the existing financial mechanisms under the Convention shall serve the Agreement in this regard.

On technology issues, Article 10 of the Paris Agreement establishes a technology framework to strengthen international cooperation on developing and transferring of climate-safe technology, along with capacity-building, in developing countries.

On capacity building, Article 11 emphasizes establishing an appropriate institutional arrangement and requires the developed countries to provide enhanced support for capacity-building actions in the developing countries.

With a view to assessing the progress towards its purpose and long-term goals, the Agreement introduces a 'Global Stocktake (GST)' process under Article 14, with each round to take place every 5 years starting from 2023.

In the implementation of all actions, measures, and commitments, the Agreement, by its Article 15, requires Parties to follow a robust transparency and accounting system when reporting on their actions and support. The Agreement includes a mechanism to facilitate implementation and promote compliance in a non-adversarial and non-punitive manner (UNFCCC, 2016).

IMPLEMENTATION PROGRESS OF THE PARIS AGREEMENT

Parties at COP 21 launched 'The Paris Agreement Work Programme (PAWP)' and established a separate negotiating body called 'the Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA)' (UNFCCC, 2016). The CMA was tasked to finalize a detailed guideline for implementation of the PA through negotiation on PAWP at COP 24. However, differentiated positions of the Parties on Article 6.2 and Article 6.4 delayed the outcome until COP 26 in Glasgow in 2021. The outcomes of COP 26 -the 'Glasgow Climate Pact- finalized the Paris Agreement Work Programme (PAWP) and the 'Paris Rulebook', making the Paris Agreement fully operational.

The COP resolved the key debated issues under PAWP, which include; a) common cycle and framework for NDCs submission, its implementation and reporting; b) transparency of market mechanisms and non-market approaches under Article 6, and c) roadmap for aligning NDCs with the Global Stocktake (GST). More importantly, the COP 26 succeeded in mobilizing political will to scale up mitigation targets under the NDCs and, for the first time, called for phase-down of coal (UNFCCC, 2022).

Ironically, the political momentum generated at COP 26 to limit global average to 1.5° C and the related side deals did not progress much, as the commitments were lofty without any specific plan to achieve them. Such a non-committal political stance made the outcome of COP 27 a clear backslide from the earlier momentum[1], allowing continuation of fossil fuels production and use, particularly gas and liquefied natural gas (LNG), branding them as "transitional clean fuels" alongside the renewables (UNFCCC, 2023a, paragraph 13).

1 COP 27 was marked by the influence and dominance of the fossil-fuel lobbyists who reportedly protected the interest of a few countries to further explore and expand the fossil-fuel market instead of transiting away. The overwhelming presence of 636 lobbyists at COP 27, a more than 25 percent increase from the figure at the Glasgow COP in 2021 and outnumbered by a single country (e.g., United Arab Emirates, hosts of COP 28 in the following year, had 1,070 registered delegates with many from the oil and gas companies), and their orchestrated favoritism towards the so-called 'clean fuel' already appeared as one of the key challenges to meaningfully scale-up emission reduction coherent to 1.5.° C Goal.

While, COP 27 did manage to break the deadlock by establishing 'new funding arrangements' for responding to and addressing L&Ds with a decision on making the fund operational by 2024 (UNFCCC, 2023b, paragraph 2), it failed to meet the aspiration of the Article 8 by deviating from the Convention's key principles CBDR-RC, equity, and historical responsibility, which exempted developed countries from their historical liability of causing loss and damages[2].

On the systemic change in addressing climate change, COP 27 called on the shareholders of Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) and International Financial Institutions (IFIs) to reform their practices and priorities. They were asked to align and scale up funding to the Paris Agreement's key goal of limiting global average temperature rise to 1.5° C with scaled-up finances from various sources and simplified access for the developing countries (UNFCCC, 2023c, paragraph 40).

Widely touted as the "Loss and Damage COP", the COP 28 started with a historic decision to adopt institutional and operational modalities of the L&D Fund and managed to mobilize USD 792 million funding pledges (UNFCCC, 2024a). While the decision on the operational modalities of L&D fund marked a strategic win for climate-vulnerable countries, this was maligned by another win for the fossil fuel imperialists, who forcibly erased any mention of fossil fuel "phaseout" from the decision text, yielding a non-binding promise that reads:

"transitioning away from fossil fuels in energy systems, in a just, orderly and equitable manner… so as to achieve net zero by 2050 in keeping with the science."

The call for 'transitioning away from fossil fuels' is not supported by any binding legal statute, hence may not be able to restrict countries from expanding fossil fuel production and use (UNFCCC, 2024b).

COP 28 also failed to mobilize adaptation finance. Instead of adopting a concrete roadmap for doubling adaptation finance and fulfilling the cumulative delivery gap of USD 600 billion (up to 2025), the COP took a procedural decision to defer the discussion until the reporting by the Standing Committee on Finance on technical progress at COP 29 (UNFCCC, 2024c, paragraph 19).

On the positive side, COP 28 published the first ever Global Stocktake report that assessed the current action 'insufficient' for achieving the 1.5° Celsius goal and urged nations to triple renewable energy capacity and double the global average annual rate of energy efficiency improvements by 2030. It also stressed the need for significantly scaling up actions efforts for adaptation and addressing climate induced loss and damage (UNFCCC, 2024b).

Like COP 27, COP 28 is also marked by the influence and dominance of fossil-fuel lobbyists, who reportedly have protected the interest of certain countries, enabling further exploration and expansion of the fossil-fuel market instead of transiting away from it. The overwhelming presence of 2456 fossil-fuel lobbyists– more than a 25 percent increase over those present at Sharm el-Sheikh COP in 2022, and their orchestrated favoritism towards fossil fuels production and use has been a key challenge to meaningfully scaling up emissions reduction consistent with the 1.5° Celsius Goal.

Parties at COP 29 adopted a new collective quantified goal (NCQG) on climate finance– at least USD 300 billion annually by 2035 to support climate action in developing countries, with developed countries expected to take the lead, while also calling on all actors to collectively mobilize and scale up financing from public and private sources to reach at least USD 1.3 trillion per year by 2035 (UNFCCC, 2025a).

While some stakeholders hailed the NCQG as marking a new era in climate finance, many developing countries deemed it insufficient, stressing the trillions of dollars required to close gaps in mitigation, adaptation, and loss and damage.

The Baku COP also advanced the operationalization of carbon trading mechanisms under Articles 6.2 and 6.4 by finalizing the rules (which still contain serious issues with quality and accountability), extended the Work Programme on gender, provided guidance on indicators for assessing progress toward the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA), adopted arrangements for the Fund responding to Loss and Damage (UNFCCC, 2025b; UNFCCC, 2025c; UNFCCC, 2025d; UNFCCC, 2025e).

2 Referring to paragraph 51 of Decision 1/CP.2 (Outcome decision of COP 21 in 2015), the COP 27 president read out 'it is understood that the outcomes of this agenda item are based on cooperation and facilitation and do not involve liability or compensation.

30th CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES (COP 30) AN OVERVIEW OF THE MAJOR AGENDA ITEMS

Climate negotiation at COP 30 will, as a rule, follow three different streams, i.e., Conference of the Parties to the Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP), Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA), and Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP). They are respectively COP 30, CMA 7 and CMP 20. The following boxes list the major agenda items of COP 30.

30th Conference of the Parties (COP 30)

- Matters relating to adaptation: a) Review of the progress, effectiveness and performance of the Adaptation Committee;* b) Nairobi work programme on impacts, vulnerability and adaptation to climate change;
- Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts (WIM): a) Joint annual report of the WIM's ExCom and the SNLD for 2024;* b) Review of the WIM;*
- Sharm el-Sheikh joint work on implementation of climate action on agriculture and food security;
- Matters relating to the least developed countries;
- Gender and climate change;
- Matters relating to technology development and transfer: a) Alignment between processes pertaining to the review of the Climate Technology Centre and Network and the periodic assessment of the Technology Mechanism;* b) Review of the functions of the Climate Technology Centre;* c) Linkages between the Technology Mechanism and the Financial Mechanism;
- Matters relating to capacity-building.

Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA 7)

- Sharm el-Sheikh mitigation ambition and implementation work programme;
- Matters relating to adaptation: a) Global goal on adaptation; b) Review of the progress, effectiveness and performance of the Adaptation Committee; c) National adaptation plans; d) Guidance relating to adaptation communications;
- Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts (WIM): a) Joint annual report of the WIM's ExCom and the SNLD for 2024; b) Review of the WIM;*
- Matters relating to finance: a) Implementation of Paris Agreement Article 9.1; b) Dialogue on the scope of Paris Agreement Article 2.1(c) and its complementarity with Article 9;
- United Arab Emirates just transition work programme;*
- Matters relating to the global stocktake (GST): a) Procedural and logistical elements of the overall GST process; b) Modalities of the UAE dialogue on implementing the GST outcomes, referred to in paragraph 97 of decision 1/CMA.5;
- Matters relating to Article 6 of the Paris Agreement: work programme under the framework for non-market approaches referred to in Article 6, paragraph 8, of the Paris Agreement and in decision 4/CMA.3;
- Reporting and review pursuant to Article 13 of the Paris Agreement: provision of financial and technical support to developing country Parties for reporting and capacity-building;
- Matters relating to technology development and transfer: a) Technology Implementation Programme.

Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP20)

- Matters relating to the forum on the impact of the implementation of response measures serving the Convention, the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement;
- Matters relating to the operation of the clean development mechanism;
- Matters relating to the Adaptation Fund;
- Reporting from and review of Parties included in Annex I to the Convention;
- Reporting from Parties not included in Annex I to the Convention.

* Agenda under both COP and CMA

CSOs POSITION ON KEY ISSUES AT COP 30

Global cooperation for addressing the climate crisis is going to mark its tenth anniversary at the 30th Conference of the Parties (COP 30), a point when ambitious political commitments and adequate support are urgently needed. Following the strong political commitments mobilized under the Paris Agreement in 2015, all the Conference of the Parties– from COP 22 in 2016 through COP 29 in 2024– failed to deliver any real outcome as orchestrated at COP 21. COP 29 in particular left the global community utterly disappointed– especially those whose very survival is threatened by climate change. Weak and dwarf outcomes from COP 29 in Baku, particularly on climate finance and other key measures, have been compounded by the growing political polarization, divesting climate and development finance to the war and militarization, and by the rise of nationalism overshadowing the globalism.

Meanwhile, climate change is advancing faster than anticipated. The year 2024 became the first on record when global temperatures in a few places recorded 1.5° C above pre-industrial levels for an entire year (WMO, 2025), pushing the Paris Agreement threshold dangerously close. This stark reality underscores the urgent need for renewed multilateral commitments and decisive action.

The CSOs from Bangladesh, standing at a critical juncture of climate reality, considering the very survival of the most vulnerable people and communities, and focusing the principles of equity and justice as enshrined in the Convention, hereby, strongly urges the Parties (to the UNFCCC) at the COP 30 to deliver strong and convincing responses.

MITIGATION

COP 29 HIGHLIGHTS

DECISION

- The COP 29 made the Paris Agreement Crediting Mechanism (PACM) operational by finalizing the rules of authorization and registration of the ITMOs to ensure transparency of carbon trading under Article 6.4.
- The finalized PACM rules include a rigorous environmental and human rights safeguarding, requiring projects to gain clear and informed consent from Indigenous Peoples before moving forward. It also includes formal procedures through which affected stakeholders may lodge complaints or challenge decisions related to the project.
- The COP 29 decision on PACM provided clarity on the authorization of the trade of carbon credits, rules of corresponding adjustment and registering them to avoid double-counting under Article 6.2. It also established a centralized accounting and reporting platform serving as a public repository.

STRATEGIC GAPS AND COMPROMISES

- The Article 6 rules contain serious issues which will allow the polluters to avoid or delay real action; CSOs termed these as “dangerous rules on carbon markets.”
- The decision allows afforestation and reforestation projects from the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) to enter the PACM, subject to meeting rules on removals. This will allow the CDM projects and the associated CERs (Certified Emission Reductions) within 2021 to be credited under the Article 6.4 mechanism. Without any additionality checks, the low-quality carbon credit from the lofty CDM projects might not be useful in emission reduction in real terms. Without sealing them, the carbon trading will drain out the collective mitigation efforts, and may end up with a zero-sum game.
- The COP 29 decision on real mitigation is utterly disappointing, marked by minimal discussion, soft language and no engagement with crucial matters like transitioning away from fossil fuels.
- COP 29 failed to provide any clear directive for the NDCs for reaching net-zero emission by 2050 through a process of gradual phasing-out from the fossil fuel-based power generation.
- The decision text completely ignored the urgency of significantly scaled-up mitigation by making no mention or reference to NDC-3 except a preambular acknowledgment of the nationally determined nature of the NDCs.

COP 30 POSITION

- **Deliver clear roadmaps for fossil fuel phaseout and tripling global renewable energy capacity and doubling global energy efficiency improvement by 2030:** The outcome of the first global stocktake (GST-1) in 2022 indicated the need for rapid and deeper emissions reduction through transitioning away from fossil fuels, and tripling global renewable energy capacity and doubling global energy efficiency improvement by 2030, with no roadmap. We demand clear roadmaps for implementing these strategies with clear sectoral targets, timelines, and comprehensive plans on resource requirement and sourcing.
- **Make a strong call to the Parties to update their NDC 3.0 with bold, transformative, and 1.5° C-aligned mitigation targets:** According to the UNEP Emissions Gap Report 2024 (UNEP, 2024), full implementation of the unconditional and conditional NDCs would reduce expected emissions in 2030 by 4 and 10 percent, respectively, compared with 2019 levels. This is far short from the requirements. Limiting global average warming to1.5° Celcius demands 42 percent of GHGs emission reduction by 2030, and keeping on the track of 2° C warming requires 28 percent of global GHGs emission reduction.

  To comply with 1.5° C and 2° C targets of global warming, the NDCs for 2025-2035 cycle need to reduce global emissions by 57 and 37 percent respectively below the 2019 levels. Against this critical scenario, countries were required to submit their ambitious climate plans (NDCs 3.0) by September 2025, which marks the inception of the Paris Ratchet mechanism requiring Parties to set more ambitious emissions reduction targets by 2035. Alarmingly, only 2 out of 59 NDCs submitted to date are aligned with a 1.5° C trajectory. Alongside, while 94 percent of the NDCs intended/reported to contributing to global energy transition goals, but none has a comprehensive plan (CAT, 2025). This is a deeply worrying sign for the implementation of the Paris Agreement and the effectiveness of multilateralism in fostering collaborative climate action.
- Therefore, we demand that COP 30 set a strong political motion in terms of further updating the NDCs with revised ambitious targets on curbing emissions. The NDC targets must be scaled-up according to the findings of the latest NDC synthesis report, the Emissions Gap Report, IPCC's AR7 (Working Group III Report), and the GST directives, so the collective emissions cut is aligned with the 1.5° C temperature rise goal. Negotiations at COP 30 must exert political momentum and commitment to ensure the new or revised NDC 3.0 satisfy the following aspects:
  - **Economy-wide absolute, stronger, ambitious, 1.5° C-aligned emission reduction targets:** The NDCs must contain more ambitious, progressive emissions reduction targets for both 2030 and 2035, compared to the previous cycles, which are aligned with 1.5° C trajectories suggested by the IPCC. The targets must cover all greenhouse gases (including curbing fossil fuel related methane emissions by 75 percent by 2030 (as per IEA, 2021), across all sectors (including defense), with absolute economy-wide targets.
  - **Alignment with the Global Stocktake outcomes:** The design of NDC must be guided by the findings of the first Global Stocktake (GST-1). Emissions pathways must reflect the urgency and requirements as identified in the GST, which include; a) policy for deeper, faster reductions, b) energy efficiency improvement, c) scaling up RE capacity, and d) phasing out fossil fuels. NDCs should clearly communicate the

reflections of GST findings in regards to reduction percentages, peaking years for the NDC-specifies sectors, timelines for transition, and measures to fill mitigation gaps.

- **Integration with biodiversity actions and ecosystem protection:** The NDCs must enhance ambition to protect, conserve, and restore land, freshwater, and ocean ecosystems; align climate and biodiversity action with the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework (KM-GBF) and National Biodiversity Strategies and Action Plans (NBSAPs). NDC should also incorporate ocean-based efforts (such as those under the High Seas Treaty); include ambitious commitments to halt and reverse deforestation, forest degradation, and the conversion of other ecosystems by 2030; ensure a rights-based approach in all ecosystem- and biodiversity-related commitments.
- **Clear definition & tracking of emissions reductions:** NDCs should set verifiable emissions reductions– absolute or intensity-based targets, with clear baselines, sectoral decomposition, and inclusion of all GHGs. There must be a robust accounting framework with an explicit guideline on how national Measurement, Reporting & Verification (MRV) System interacts with the NDC and the Biennial Transparency Report.
- **Synergy with other national plans:** Targets in the NDCs must ensure coherence and maximum synergy with other relevant national policy instruments, such as NAP, LT-LEDS (Long-term Low Emissions Development Strategy), etc.
- **Equity:** The NDCs must reflect equity through ensuring fair shares in domestic emissions reduction with developed countries taking the lead, and in accordance to CBDR-RC, and fair shares of financial supports.
- **Inclusivity and justice:** The design and implementation of the NDCs must reflect inclusion and human rights obligations. Meaningful, informed, and effective participation of all rights-holders, including Indigenous Peoples, local communities, women and youth, persons with disabilities in the design, implementation, and MEL cycle of NDCs. NDCs must be gender-responsive, child-sensitive, and disability-inclusive. They should reference mandatory human rights and environmental due diligence regulations.
- **Plan on resource requirement and mobilization:** The NDCs must include a clear plan on the requirements and deliveries of financial and other resources for implementing the emission reduction targets, in the light of CBDR-RC. Developed countries must include information on their plans to provide financial (in grants-equivalent terms, in the light of Article 9.1 of the PA) and other supports (technology, capacity development, etc.) to assist developing countries in implementing their NDCs. The developing countries must provide estimates of finance and other supports (with sources– public and private, domestic and external and instruments) required to implement their NDCs.

- **Ensure outcome-oriented effort under the Mitigation Work Programme (MWP):** We expect the MWP to shift from broad technical dialogues to clear, actionable, and outcome-oriented decisions that strengthen the mitigation agenda in line with 1.5° C warming pathway. COP 30 must ensure a renewed effort under the MWP which overcomes the divisions that have prevented substantive outcomes in previous years. The MWP must deliver renewed cooperative solutions for reducing emissions in the industry, agriculture, forestry and other land use (AFOLU), and waste sectors in a complementary manner to the GST. The substance from the MWP dialogues must inform cooperative actions that countries, subnational governments and non-state actors adopt to reduce emissions by 2030.
- **Ensure revision and implementation of NDCs and GST outcome on mitigation, the major focus of the MWP:** The MWP remains the only formal mechanism under the COP/CMA dedicated to discussions on mitigation implementation. However, the MWP has increasingly struggled to fulfill its mandate due to persistent political deadlocks. To enhance its relevance and effectiveness, the MWP must be refocused toward technical discussions on the development and implementation of NDCs, guided by the mitigation outcomes of the Global Stocktake. The MWP must also focus on overcoming political manipulation, delay tactics, and obstruction, and serve as a platform to operationalize GST guidance and strengthen NDC implementation.

- **MWP must ensure equity, justice, and environmental integrity:** COP 30 must build the foundation for the MWP to substantially improve it through reflecting the discussions of the MWP Global Dialogues. It must center Indigenous Peoples' and local communities' collective rights as the foundation for effective forest protection, recognize the importance of synergies between climate change mitigation, and wider social, health and environmental benefits. It should acknowledge the critical role of ecological integrity in forests as central to their climate role, and ensure equitable accountability by addressing consumption and other drivers of primary forest loss. It must exclude consideration of bioenergy in the implementation of GST, MWP outcomes or climate finance mechanisms. MWP must also ensure that emphasis on carbon markets does not undermine genuine forest protection by promoting false narrative that forest carbon removals can compensate for fossil fuel emissions.
- **Set a mandatory timeline for submitting LT-LEDS and provide sufficient supports:** While the Paris Agreement requires all countries to strive to formulate and communicate long-term low GHG emission development strategies (LT-LEDS) (UNFCCC, 2016), only 79 countries have submitted their LT-LEDS to date, with majority yet to submit (UNFCCC, 2025f). The COP 30 must indicate a mandatory deadline for all countries for submitting the LT-LEDS. COP 30 must require countries to make the LT-LEDS fully integrated with NDCs, NAPs, long-term sectoral strategies, and national sustainable development priorities, ensuring coherence across climate, biodiversity, and development policies. We also demand their linkages with the UNFCCC transparency framework and the Global Stocktake for ensuring accountability and learning. COP 30 must also require the developed countries, in line with the Article 9.1 of the Paris Agreement, to provide supports (finance, technology, and capacity development) to the countries in regards to developing their LT-LEDS, to ensure that countries submit their LT-LEDS following that timeline.
- **Ensure significant cut in fossil fuel subsidies:** The fossil fuel subsidies, preventing reflection of true market price and incentivizing fossil fuel use, have been a major barrier to curbing fossil fuel consumption and resulting emissions. We demand that COP 30 build a political momentum on a significant cut in fossil fuel subsidies especially in the major emitting countries in the light of equity and justice. Governments must leverage the current low level of global oil prices to reform their fossil fuel subsidy with minimal disruption to businesses and individual consumers.
- **Define methodologies for carbon trading and address issues of Article 6 RMP:** COP 29 (CMA6) finalized rules, modalities, and procedures (RMP) for carbon trading under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement which is accompanied with no decision on several risk issues, such as a) Actions against any "inconsistencies" or non-compliance with carbon credit deals, b) additionality check for CDM projects to enter PACM, c) durability standard for carbon removal projects (UNFCCC, 2025c; UNFCCC, 2025d). The methodology for the trading is also yet to be defined. Therefore, we urge the Supervisory Body to define the methodology for carbon trading at this 30th session of the COP. We strongly demand that the Parties at COP 30 will decide punitive measures for non-compliance in carbon credit registration, setting durability standards for carbon removal, requiring additionality check for CDM projects to enter PACM.
- **Provide capacity building support to vulnerable countries to engage with carbon market:** We strongly urge the COP 30 (CMA7) to require the developed countries urgently provide capacity building support to the vulnerable countries, particularly the SIDS, LDCs, and developing countries, to enhance their capacity on the Article 6 RMP and utilize the potentials of carbon trading for reducing global emissions.

ADAPTATION

COP 29 HIGHLIGHTS

DECISION

- COP 29 confirmed finalizing a list of maximum 100 indicators at COP 30 in Belem in 2025. It also directed the UAE-Belem Work 09 Programme to include qualitative, quantitative, input, output, outcome, impact and process indicators.
- It specified that the adaptation indicators should enable aggregation of the data to inform the Global Stocktake (GST) framework. It further noted that the application of these indicators in tracking adaptation progress shall be universal in scope, encompassing all Parties, including Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and Small Island Developing States (SIDS).
- It decided to launch the Baku Adaptation Roadmap to facilitate implementation of the elements considered under the UAE framework; also established the Baku high- level dialogue on adaptation, mandated to identifying ways of enhancing the implementation of the UAE framework.

STRATEGIC GAPS AND COMPROMISES

- The COP29 directed the UAE–Belém Work Programme to include "quantitative and qualitative indicators for enabling factors for the implementation of adaptation action, including means of implementation". Indicators on "'enabling factors", such as, governance, transparency, anti-corruption, etc. may subject developing countries to a new set of compliances (whereby creating barriers) for accessing the adaptation finance.
- COP29 failed to deliver any decision on NAP implementation. It deferred the discussion to SB 62 in June 2025 in Bonn for recommending a draft decision for consideration and adoption at COP30 in November 2025. Unfortunately, the UNFCCC negotiation process has downgraded the urgency of NAP implementation.

COP 30 POSITION

- **Deliver a robust set of scientific, comprehensive, and practical indicators grounded in universal human rights principles for measuring the progress towards achieving the GGA targets:** Parties at COP 30 will adopt the final list of 100 indicators for measuring the progress towards achieving the GGA targets. We strongly demand that the final set of indicators fulfill the following aspects:
  - Reflects the latest scientific knowledge on adaptation and adaptation needs, while also giving full respect to traditional knowledge, Indigenous Peoples' knowledge, local knowledge systems, ecosystem-based adaptation, nature-based solutions, locally led and community-based adaptation, disaster risk reduction, intersectional approaches, private sector engagement, maladaptation avoidance, recognition of adaptation co-benefits and sustainable development.
  - Captures information pertaining to social inclusion, Indigenous Peoples, participatory processes, human rights, gender equality, migrants, children and young people, and persons with disabilities. It should also reflect the unique vulnerabilities of children to climate change impacts across the thematic targets and cross-cutting issues related to education and the health of children and young people.
  - Ensure the indicators are globally relevant and easily nationally adaptable, reflecting national circumstances, enabling Parties to choose which indicators they will report on in the light of their national circumstances.
  - Ensure the indicators includes clear indicators on the means of implementation (MOI), i.e., finance, capacity building, technology transfer, etc. for each thematic and dimensional target under the GGA framework, with clear timelines and channels of mobilization.
  - Ensure the indicators for MOI are able to measure a) access, b) quality and c) quantity of adaptation finance, including provision, in line with the Paris Agreement, to help Parties address needs and gaps in implementing the GGA.
  - Ensure the indicators on transformational adaptation are highly compatible with the socio-economic, cultural, and political context of the individual countries.
  - Ensures maximum level of climate-sensitivity

and adaptation relevance bolstered by strong methodology and other aspects of metadata, including relevant levels of disaggregation.

- **Ensure technical guidance to enhance implementation:** COP 30 must ensure technical guidance to the Parties on methodologies, data standards, including typologies and taxonomies, and data collection to enable implementation of the indicators.
- **Create mechanisms for exchanging knowledge and experiences to boost cooperation:** COP 30 must establish mechanisms for peer exchange to promote international data cooperation, among Parties and with technical organisations with specialization in specific datasets.
- **Provide capacity building supports:** COP 30 must ensure capacity-building support required by developing countries for initiating and enhancing systematic collection, analysis, management, and monitoring of data; use of indicators in formulation of NAPs; reporting on implementation, especially in terms of the new indicators (if any); and meeting the requirements on enabling factors of adaptation implementation.
- **Make sure the indicators for adaptation enablers do not hinder implementation of adaptation efforts and finance flow thereto:** COP 30 must ensure that the indicators on adaptation enablers do not prevent implementation of urgent adaptation efforts in the vulnerable areas or hinder finance flow to those activities or interventions.
- **Establish a process for reviewing and updating of the indicators:** Adaptation to climate change is a dynamic process which requires revisiting the relevance and feasibility of indicators according to the evolving landscape. Therefore, COP 30 must create a process for regular reviews and updates to ensure that the indicators remain robust, responsive, and fit for purpose. The process must be aligned with Global Stocktake cycles, incorporating lessons from implementation, scientific updates (e.g., from IPCC reports, UNEP Adaptation Gap Report, etc.) and the latest data.
- **Institutionalize Locally Led Adaptation (LLA) and ensure direct access for the local entities to implement LLA efforts:** The Paris Agreement (Article 7) highlights that adaptation must be country-driven, gender-responsive, and inclusive, guided by local and traditional knowledge. This spirit recognizes that people living with the impacts of climate change are best placed to shape the solutions. We strongly urge Parties at COP 30 to commit for integrating LLA principles, e.g., participation, transparency, local leadership, and access to finance into national policies, sectoral plans, and local government systems, through policy and budget reforms and providing dedicated finance and other MOI. Parties at COP 30 must ensure the local people and institutions have direct access to resources from the financing mechanism under UNFCCC to implement their LLA efforts.
- **Deliver a new commitment for scaled-up adaptation finance:** With GGA indicator framework finalized at COP 30, achieving the GGA will require addressing the adaptation gaps through significantly scaled-up finances. We strongly demand that Parties at COP 30 agree on a new adaptation finance commitment to ensure that the GGA is not just a MEL exercise and can lead to meaningful increase in adaptation implementation.
- **Ensure meaningful reflection of the need for transboundary and transformational adaptation:** The escalating climate crisis is driving adaptation beyond traditional boundaries. Transformational adaptation and transboundary adaptation are defying existing frameworks and calling for more systemic, forward-looking approaches. COP 30 must leverage its pivotal opportunity to define these priorities and to ensure the indicator framework

captures these essentials for building long-term resilience. Parties at COP 30 must also guarantee finance, capacity building, research, and technology support for understanding, designing, and implementing transformational adaptation in countries, particularly, SIDS, LDCs, and vulnerable developing countries.

- **Clarify the scope, modalities, timelines, and institutional mechanisms under the Baku Adaptation Roadmap (BAR):** The Baku Adaptation Roadmap formally established the GGA as a permanent agenda of all future COP sessions while mandating a comprehensive review of progress on the GGA as part of the second Global Stocktake (GST) in 2028 (UNFCCC, 2025b). Parties at COP 30 must define the scope, modalities, timelines, and institutional arrangements under the Baku Adaptation Roadmap to create a clear bridge from agreed targets and indicators to scaled-up actions, including an improved access to the means of implementation for developing countries. It must also clarify the role of science and evidence in guiding this process, while setting out a coherent pathway for the post-Belém adaptation agenda.
- **Ensure means of implementation for formulation and implementation of National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) in the developing countries:** National Adaptation Plan has been a major area with virtually no progress for several sessions of the COP. Contention around the inclusion of MoI, particularly its role as a key enabler of adaptation, led to no progress in shaping decision. The COP 29 and SB62 ended without any agreement on NAP implementation. Therefore, COP 30 must deliver substantive decision text requiring the developed country parties to urgently provide the developing countries with public finance and other supports for formulation and implementation of their NAPs. Any decision text on NAP without provision of accessible public finance will not bear fruit.
- **Set a deadline for submission of the NAPs:** As the indicators for measuring the progress towards implementing GGA are going to be finalized at COP 30, it becomes urgent for countries to have their NAPs in place. As of September 1, 2025, 64 developing countries including 22 LDCs and 14 SIDS have submitted their NAPs (UNFCCC, 2025e). We demand a strong decision from the COP 30 requiring all the countries, that have not yet submitted their NAPs, to submit their NAPs within a specified time.
- **Provide sustained finance for implementing the objective of Nairobi Work Programme (NWP):** COP 29 emphasized the role of Nairobi Work Program in exchange of knowledge, experience and information and sharing of best practices pertaining to the thematic and dimensional targets for GGA under the UAE framework (UNFCCC, 2025b), however without any decisive text on finance for implementing the objective of NWP. COP 30 must deliver decisive texts on providing sustained, dedicated finance through the UNFCCC to enable full and effective implementation of the mandates defined under the NWP.
- **Strengthen the role of the NWP in applying foresight-driven approaches to long-term and transformational adaptation:** COP 30 must broaden the mandate of the NWP to developing forward-looking strategies to inform with knowledge and know-how to support transformational adaptation and resilience.



LOSS AND DAMAGE

COP 29 HIGHLIGHTS

DECISION

- Loss and Damage did not get much light at COP 29 as the debates around the agenda had been 'solved' with the establishment of an L&D-dedicated Fund at COP 27 and its operationalization at COP 28. Hence, the L&D negotiations at COP 29 were confined to several procedural discussions and decisions, which include:
- "Urges the Parties to deliver their pledges as soon as possible, and requests the FRLD Board to engage with the relevant Parties to ensure delivery of the pledges, and thereby increase the predictability of resources for the Fund."
- "Welcomes the progress in implementation of the WIM ExCom's five-year rolling work plan and requests the SBs to review the implementation of the work plan at SB 62."
- "Welcomes the Advisory Board established at COP 27 in 2022 and interim Secretariat of the Santiago Network at the UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR) and the UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS), and adopts rules of procedure to continue their work."

STRATEGIC GAPS AND COMPROMISES

- Parties at COP 29 were expected to commit new and additional funding to the FRLD (Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage). However, the COP failed to mobilize additional funding commitment for immediate and the long-term operations of the Fund. A scheduled replenishment effort (every four years) is due in late 2026.
- The COP couldn't agree to establish a separate "window" within the NCQG for addressing loss and damages.
- There is disappointment with the WIM's performance as the developing country Parties term it a "low-ambition and insufficient" mechanism. WIM's outputs are merely an expert-driven academic exercise that excludes involvement of practitioners, local communities, and Indigenous Peoples in the expert group's discussions.
- There is a significant coordination gap among the WIM, the Santiago Network, and the FRLD; Parties at COP 29 suggested to establish a mechanism for their increased collaboration to potentially engage them to produce "global state report of loss and damage".

COP 30 POSITION

- **Establish Loss and Damage as a permanent agenda item:** The landscape on Loss and Damage (L&D) has evolved considerably in recent years; however, negotiations remain fragmented and largely confined to technical bodies such as the WIM, the Santiago Network for Loss and Damage (SNLD), and the FRLD. To address this gap, COP 30 must decide to establish a permanent agenda item on L&D, ensuring, enhanced coordination, policy advancement, and scaled-up finance to effectively respond to loss and damage.
- **Establish a Loss and Damage finance sub-goal under NCQG:** We urge the COP 30 Presidency- designate to consider Loss and Damage a key priority at Belém. The COP 29 outcome on the New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG) failed to establish longer-term finance for addressing loss and damage. It is therefore imperative for the COP 30 that the NCQG Roadmap (the Baku-to-Belém Roadmap to USD 1.3T) include a sub-goal on Loss and Damage finance, excluding humanitarian assistance or emergency response funds, with clear options for the provision of public, grant-based resources to developing countries. Such finance must be commensurate with the scale of needs and additional to adaptation finance within the Roadmap.
- **Mandate to launch a global, scientific assessment of Loss and Damage and build human rights-based institutions and approaches:** The review of the WIM provides an opportunity to bolster coordination among loss and damage bodies, integrate human rights across institutional arrangements, and address existing knowledge and finance gaps. COP 30 must mandate a Loss and Damage Gap Report to annually document scenario of Loss and Damage, both economic and non-economic, and the practices and actions for averting, minimizing, and addressing L&Ds. This should also estimate financial need for addressing L&Ds, with developing countries' aggregate financial and technical assistance needs, available funding, and resulting gaps. Additionally, it must task the WIM, in collaboration with relevant UN institutions and in consultation with rights holders, to develop guidance on human rights- and equity-based

approaches for all UNFCCC loss and damage mechanisms, drawing on the UN Secretary-General's analytical study for the Human Rights Council.

- **Provide FRLD resources at the scale needed to address both economic and non-economic L&Ds, following a rights-based approach and ensuring easy access:** COP 30 must strongly urge the countries to capitalize the FRLD with public grant-based finances at a current annual scale of at least USD 400 billion, commensurate with the current estimated annual needs of at least USD 724.43 billion for the developing countries (Sharma, et al., 2024). The current pledges amount only 768.40 million USD, of which only 358.50 million USD have actually been paid– less than 0.2 percent of the figure that the FRLD will need to disburse each year. The Barbados Implementation Modalities (BIM) for the start- up phase must deliver a comprehensive set of grant-based early interventions to address both economic and non-economic L&Ds, including displacement and human mobility, resulting from rapid-onset and slow-onset events. These interventions should be facilitated through direct access mechanisms, including direct budget support, programmatic approaches, ensuring responsiveness to the diverse needs of affected communities.

  Parties at COP 30 must furthermore decide a clear replenishment cycle, comparable to that of the GCF. COP 30 must also galvanize political commitment to operationalize the fund prioritizing resource disbursement to the most vulnerable communities, particularly marginalized groups, women and girls, children, persons with disabilities, migrants, and refugees, and indigenous peoples, small grant with direct access modality.
- **Establish a trigger-based disbursement mechanism for fast-track delivery of FRLD resources:** Parties at COP 30 must agree to establish a trigger-based disbursement mechanism for FRLD, based on a set of parametric indicators to release rapid response funds for addressing L&Ds from sudden-onset disasters.
- **Develop metrics for non-economic loss and damages (NELDs):** COP 30 must launch a work program to develop metrics for NELD (violation of natural rights, loss of cultural heritage, health disruption, displacement, biodiversity loss, etc.) with valuation guidance and community consent protocols to enable addressing the NELDs in a focused and structured way.
- **Expedite SNLD Advisory Board's efforts in catalyzing technical assistance requests:** COP 30 must call on the SNLD Advisory Board to identify strategies to urgently increase the number of requests for technical assistance. This should include clarifying the types of assistance available for technical assistance and encouraging submissions from a broad range of actors, including developing country governments and community-based organizations. Furthermore, COP 30 must require the Advisory Board to establish clear procedures for addressing requests that need an urgent response.
- **Define clear milestones for SNLD strategies:** At COP 30, Parties must urge the SNLD Advisory Board to establish clear and measurable milestones for the implementation and iterative refinement of the Santiago Network's overall strategy for 2026–2028, along with related strategies on communications, outreach, engagement, and resource mobilization. This process should incorporate synergies with other key loss and damage entities and negotiations, including alignment with the FRLD Board's resource mobilization efforts, and ensure that the Network adopts inclusive and accessible working modalities to maximize its reach and effectiveness.
- **Strengthen collaboration of SNLD with the ExCom and FRLD:** COP 30 must encourage the SNLD Advisory Board to strengthen collaboration with the ExCom and the FRLD Board through concrete, action-oriented decisions. This collaboration must involve all relevant actors, including the Co-Chairs, members, and Secretariats of each body, as well as the FRLD Executive Director and the SNLD Director. With respect to the ExCom, cooperation must focus on the exchange of knowledge and technical guidance, while the SNLD should prioritize identifying ways to collaborate with the FRLD in delivering technical assistance.

FINANCE

COP 29 HIGHLIGHTS

DECISION

- COP 29 succeeded in setting a quantum of climate finance in two different scales.
  - First: It called for enabling scaling up climate finance from all public and private sources to at least USD 1.3 trillion per year by 2035. The decision emphasized extending and exploring a wide variety of sources beyond the governments. With this focus, it launched "Baku to Belém Roadmap" to explore how the USD 1.3 trillion could be reached, albeit with limited further detail.
  - Second: It decided, as an extension of the USD 100 billion goal, and with developed countries taking the lead, mobilizing at least USD 300 billion per year by 2035 for developing countries' climate action (both adaptation and mitigation) from a from a wide variety of sources, public and private, bilateral and multilateral, including alternative sources. It also decided to conduct a review of this newly agreed finance goal by 2030.
- The associated text with the above decisions called on Parties to recognize the voluntary intention of the Parties to count all climate-related outflows and climate-related finance mobilized by multilateral development banks toward achievement of the goal.

STRATEGIC GAPS AND COMPROMISES

- COP 29 decisions encouraged voluntary contributions from the developing countries (which could be a potential first step to imposing responsibility on developing countries), recognized all climate-related finance (including loans and grants— public and private) towards fulfilling NCQG targets, and provided legitimacy and enormous business opportunities for the MDBs to profit from the climate crisis.
- The NCQG deal signals a loan-heavy climate finance regime, which risks deepening the crisis by intensifying both climate and debt risks of vulnerable countries. This is a clear deviance from the justice-based narrative of climate finance focuses on grant-based, new and additional (i.e., in addition to the existing ODA commitments), and obligatory contributions from developed countries.

COP 30 POSITION

- **Embed Article 9.1 of the Paris Agreement as a standalone agenda item, reaffirm financial commitment thereunder as legal obligation and ensure its implementation with transparency and accountability:** Article 9.1 of the Paris Agreement obligated country Parties to provide financial resources to assist developing country Parties for mitigation and adaptation, in the light of CBDR-RC (UNFCCC, 2016). In this respect, we strongly demand COP 30 presidency to reaffirm that Article 9.1 is a legal obligation of the developed countries, not voluntary, as underscored by the International Court of Justice in their Advisory Opinion of July 2025 (ICJ, 2025). To be effective, climate finance must be public, grant- based rather than loans or debt-creating instruments. COP 30 (CMA7) must establish a transparent framework to track how much finance is being provided under Article 9.1, how it is being disbursed, and whether it meets developing countries' needs. The commitments must be fulfilled at a scale that matches the urgent climate mitigation and adaptation needs of developing countries, addressing the insufficient commitments under the NCQG. The matters relating to Article 9.1 must be established as a stand-alone agenda item at COP 30 (or a dedicated work programme), to ensure it is directly and officially addressed, not hidden inside broader finance discussions.
- **Ensure the Baku to Belem Roadmap to 1.3T provide comprehensive, accountable and justice-based modalities, for financing:** The "Baku to Belém Roadmap to 1.3T" was established under the decision on the New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG) on Climate Finance, adopted at COP 29 (i.e. CMA6), with the report to be provided to the CMA7 (COP 30). The Roadmap must complement realizing the global goal of limiting average temperature rise to1.5° Celsius and climate-resilient development pathways by supporting implementation of NDCs and NAPs (UNFCCC, 2025a). By this mandate, the Roadmap is the most crucial climate finance agenda at CMA7, it gives an opportunity to strengthen the quality, accessibility, and impact of climate finance in shaping the future of the climate actions in the developing countries. We strongly demand that

the Roadmap address the following:

- A living document: The Roadmap must function as a dynamic and recurring process, guided by the best available science, and aligned with the cycles of Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), National Adaptation Plans (NAPs), LT-LEDS, and other climate plans under UNFCCC. The roadmap must align the sectoral finance targets with the GST results, currently GST-1. It must reflect the evolving needs, priorities, and circumstances of developing countries, while accommodating their diverse transition pathways and development approaches, and ensuring regional balance in the delivery of climate finance.
- Built on quantified evidence: For the Roadmap to be credible, to support the implementation of the NCQG, and to drive meaningful change, it must be firmly rooted in evidence and transparent analysis. It should identify how much funding will come from each funding source, to achieve the 1.3T.
- Loss and Damage finance: The Roadmap must address the gaps in the NCQG by establishing a clear plan for the developed countries to provide public, grant-based finance to address L&Ds needs in the developing countries. Finance should also support the Santiago Network (SNLD) and the Warsaw International Mechanism (WIM).
- Adaptation finance: The Roadmap must include measures to significantly scale up adaptation finance, predominantly public grant-based and highly concessional finance, including by calling for a target of tripling adaptation finance by 2030 from 2025 levels.
- Balanced sub-goals: The NCQG failed to specify sub-goals or affirm balance across mitigation, adaptation, and Loss and Damage. The Roadmap must define clear, public finance sub-goals across these areas, with explicit attention to inclusive Just Transition pathways.
- Scaling up finance: The Roadmap must include a ratcheting-up mechanism, beginning with a USD 300 billion annual floor in 2025 and progressively scaling up to USD 1.3 trillion annually by 2035. This should be accompanied by periodic reassessments, upward adjustments based on effectiveness reviews, and evolving needs of developing countries.
- Quality, accessibility, and inclusion: The Roadmap must identify systemic barriers to climate finance by enhancing quality, accessibility, and reducing the cost of capital, while avoiding debt burdens, and propose concrete solutions to address these. Finance should prioritize grants, highly concessional instruments, and non-debt-creating mechanisms, particularly for LDCs and SIDS. The Roadmap must also guarantee just, transparent, and timely access to climate finance under the NCQG and ensure that finance is used effectively and reaches those who need it most. Direct access must be ensured for the governments (including through budget support), national and regional institutions, sub-national authorities, civil society, Indigenous Peoples, and local communities. It must deliberately extend benefits to women and girls, children and youth, persons with disabilities, migrants, refugees, and other climate-vulnerable groups.
- Significantly scaling up public finance delivery through the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism: Paragraph 16 of the NCQG decided on significantly increasing the provision of public resources through the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism of the UNFCCC. The Roadmap must deliver clear timelines and quantified goals for capitalizing and replenishing the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism with public resources.
- Equity and justice principles: The Roadmap must uphold the principles of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR-RC), supporting country-driven strategies while ensuring balance between adaptation and mitigation, and embedding Just Transition pathways across sectors.
- Definition of climate finance: A universally agreed definition is essential to avoid the overstatement of contributions and to ensure clarity on what qualifies as climate finance. The Roadmap must therefore establish an equitable framework to establish an equitable, rights-based definition of climate finance, ensuring it is new, additional, public, grant-based, predictable, timely, pro- poor, gender-transformative, precautionary, and highly concessional.

- Transparency and accountability: The Roadmap must embed a robust transparency and accountability framework with prescriptive guidance on rules, responsibilities, timelines, and mechanisms for reporting and tracking progress in its implementation. This includes reporting on sources, instruments, flows, gender responsiveness, and impacts, while ensuring alignment with developing countries' priorities. The Roadmap must also clearly articulate how it interacts with and informs other transparency and accountability mechanisms under the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement, including the Global Stocktake, Article 2.1(c) Dialogue, and Standing Committee on Finance reports.
- Capacity building and community empowerment: Technical assistance for project preparation, feasibility studies, and risk assessments must be prioritized in the Roadmap to make projects impactful for addressing the climate needs and scalable. Above all, finance mobilized through the Roadmap must empower vulnerable communities, respecting the rights and priorities of Indigenous Peoples, women and girls, youth, and local communities, ensuring that climate action is justice- and rights- aligned.
- Take relevant multilateral initiatives into account: The Roadmap must take into account relevant multilateral initiatives, including advisory opinions from the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), International Court of Justice (ICJ), and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) that reaffirm states' legal obligations to act on climate change. Sharm el-Sheikh Dialogue on Article 2.1(c), Global Solidarity Levies Task Force, UN Framework Convention on International Tax Cooperation, Human Rights Council– recommendations from the Universal Periodic Review, reports of the UN Secretary-General, and findings of Special Rapporteurs on climate finance and loss and damage, etc.

- **Ensure reform of the international financial systems:** COP 30 must deliver a strong, substantive decision on reforming international financial system, particularly, IMF, World Bank, WTO, MDBs, and IFIs, with a focus on reducing the cost of capital, increasing concessional and non-debt finance, and aligning resources with the climate priorities of developing countries. The decision text must include strong signal to prevent MDBs from labeling fossil fuel projects as climate finance and ensure transparent disclosure of fossil fuel investments by the MDBs. It must also call for strengthening country-platform approaches and co-financing for long-term transformation. MDBs must be urged for reforming capital adequacy rules and adopting hybrid capital models to increase climate finance without heightening debt risks and introducing Climate-Resilient Debt Clauses 2 (CRDCs) for pausing debt repayment after disasters to reduce repayment burden of the vulnerable countries. The decision text must also prescribe reforms for multilateral climate funds, including streamlined and harmonized application procedures across funds, accelerated disbursement timelines, and increased contributions of grant-based finance, particularly for LDCs and SIDS.
- **Deliver domestic resource mobilization commitments:** Parties at COP 30 must present domestic resource mobilization commitments e.g. aviation and shipping carbon tax, pollution tax on foreign plastic imports, earmarking environmental levies and natural capital royalties to a "Climate & Resilience Window" aligned with NDC 3.0 priorities

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- **Ensure that the Article 2.1c focuses on both increasing climate-aligned finance and cutting back climate-harming finance:** COP 30 must ensure that Article 2.1c mandate includes both a) increasing flows of climate-aligned finance and b) reducing flows, e.g., harmful fossil fuel subsidies, that undermine the objectives of Paris Agreement. COP 30 must also leverage the opportunity to assess and address the adverse impacts of debt, debt distress, and debt-servicing finance flows, including their role in reinforcing climate-harming industries such as fossil fuels.
- **Ensure a quick shift from dialogue to action under Article 2.1c:** At COP 30, Parties must initiate a decisive shift from the Sharm el-Sheikh Dialogue (SeSD) toward formal negotiations on aligning financial flows with pathways consistent with low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development. A key outcome must be the establishment of a clear and universally agreed definition of green investment, ensuring transparency, adaptability to national contexts, and alignment with the public interest. Furthermore, Parties at COP 30 must agree on the creation of a comprehensive global transition finance framework, incorporating defined targets and implementation plans for governments, financial institutions, corporations, and projects; an accounting framework to systematically track the alignment of financial flows under Article 2.1(c); and integration of just transition principles into all financial decision-making processes to ensure equity and inclusivity in the transition to climate-resilient, low-emission development pathways.

GLOBAL STOCKTAKE

COP 30 POSITION

- **Translate GST-1 outcomes into Action ensuring equity and CBDR-RC:** COP 30 must operationalize the outcomes of the first GST (i.e., para 20–96 of decision 1/CMA.5) through concrete mandates, work programmes, and timelines. This includes integrating GST guidance into NDC 3.0, Long-Term Low Emission Development Strategies (LT-LEDS), and National Adaptation Plans (NAPs). The GST implementation must prioritize addressing the mitigation needs (transitioning away of fossil fuels, tripling RE capacity and doubling energy efficiency improvements by 2030) and gaps in the means of implementation, particularly finance, for implementing climate actions in developing countries. Alongside, addressing adaptation gaps, and L&Ds must also get due attention. All these actions must reflect equity and Common But Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities (CBDR-RC).
- **Define modalities of the UAE Dialogue:** The outcomes and spirit of the GST-1 remain largely absent from national and international commitments, particularly among developed countries. Within the UNFCCC process, this lack of political will is reflected in the ongoing deadlock crippling the UAE Dialogue. The significant divergence over its scope and modalities has become a key barrier to advancing the implementation of GST-1 outcomes. COP 30 must serve as a turning point by clearly defining the scope and modalities of the UAE Dialogue. The dialogue should be designed to strengthen enabling conditions and address key barriers, such as unilateral measures that divert financial flows away from developing countries. The Dialogue must serve as a mechanism to reassess collective progress or track implementation of NDCs and the GST in its entirety. Moreover, it must foster meaningful peer-to-peer knowledge exchange and mutual capacity-building among Parties to support the design and implementation of national climate policies in line with GST outcomes.
- **Establish a robust Accountability and Tracking of GST outcome implementation:** COP 30 should establish a mechanism to track and review implementation of GST outcomes at subsequent COP/CMA sessions, ensuring continuous assessment and correction.
- **Consider IPCC the main source of scientific information for GST:** On procedural and logistical elements of the GST, we demand that the CMA7 (COP 30) decide IPCC as the main sources of scientific information for informing the stocktaking process. We further demand that COP 30 request IPCC to align the timing of its assessment reports with the GST process. The COP should guide the IPCC for ensuring a diversity of scientific inputs including the local knowledge and developing country experiences to ensure the GST outcome reflects latest scenario with highest accuracy and represent real local contexts. We also call upon COP 30 to enshrine addressing loss and damage as a standalone thematic area within the GST.

JUST TRANSITION

COP 29 HIGHLIGHTS

DECISION

- The COP Presidency reported no consensus on Just Transition Work Programme (JTWP) and proposed to continue the discussion at SB 62 with a view to forwarding a draft decision for adoption by COP 30/CMA 7 in 2025.

STRATEGIC GAPS AND COMPROMISES

- The JTWP was established at CMA 4 (i.e., COP 27) in 2022. However, very little progress has been made in deciding the ambition, scope, and issues of MOI under it. Instead, many conflicts emerged in the JTWP meetings.
- Parties at COP 29 failed to reach an agreement on several conflicting issues, like the need for skills development, provision of finances and MoI for just transition, integration of labor rights, human rights and unilateral trade measures, recognizing socio-economic opportunities for transitioning away from fossil fuels, etc.

COP 30 POSITION

- **Establish an action mechanism for 1.5 degrres Celsius aligned, rights-based , inclusive, and holistic just transition with provision of MOI:** COP 30 must establish an Action Mechanism to strengthen, accelerate, and implement a holistic Just Transition across all sectors of the economy, both within and among countries, through international cooperation grounded in the principles of equity and CBDR-RC. This Mechanism must clearly and comprehensively address transition pathways related to phasing out fossil fuels, transforming agriculture and food systems, decarbonizing industrial processes, and scaling up renewable energy deployment consistent with the 1.5° Celsius trajectory, while ensuring safeguards to the rights of the vulnerable groups. In effect, the mechanism must:
  - Build on gender- and human rights-based approaches to just transition pathways; Strive to ensure universal access to clean, reliable, affordable and sustainable energy for all, including through the scaled-up deployment of renewable energy and access to clean cooking;
  - Include strategies to safeguard labor rights (re-skilling, decent job creation, livelihood diversification, etc.), human rights, the rights of women, persons with disabilities, and Indigenous Peoples, local communities, migrants, children, and people in vulnerable situations and ensure gender equality and women empowerment;
  - Guarantee meaningful participation of these rights holders in development and implementation of JT strategies;
  - Guarantee no-harm or ensure compensation for the implementation of trade-restrictive unilateral measures;
  - Provide guidance on integrating the just transition strategies and efforts into the climate and development plans of the countries and sectors;
  - Address the growing demand for transition minerals;
  - Include concrete plan of international cooperation and MOI (finance– grants and highly concessional loans, capacity building, technologies, etc.) to ensure implementation of the just transition strategies;
- **Ensure a robust monitoring, evaluation, and learning (MEL) system for tracking progress:** With the adoption of strategies and legislation, several countries have now entered the implementation phase of just transition. However, no standardized framework exists for monitoring and tracking progress. COP 30 must therefore establish a robust mechanism for assessing whether just transitions are being effectively implemented or where adjustments are required. Such a mechanism should be grounded in the International Labour Organization's (ILO) guidelines for a just transition, should be context-specific and responsive to different administrative levels, particularly the local level, where impacts will be most acutely experienced. The MEL system should be capable of capturing risks, responses, and outcomes associated with the transition of fossil fuel sectors. The MEL system also should ensure flexibility to reflect diverse national and

local circumstances through context-appropriate indicators. This will provide a credible basis for tracking progress, identifying gaps, and strengthening accountability in the delivery of just transition.

- **Include private sector in the just transition considerations:** Role of governments has been given the highest emphasis in shaping policies to enable a just transition. However, the private sector also bears significant responsibility for ensuring the effective implementation of just transition principles and must contribute meaningfully to this process. While some promising initiatives exist, overall corporate action remains insufficient, with analysis indicating that readiness levels for just transition are particularly low outside the energy and electricity sectors (UNFCCC-KCI, 2025). Therefore, we demand that COP 30 require Parties to adopt measures that ensure private sector engagement, including through appropriate regulatory frameworks and incentive structures, to guarantee that companies across value chains play their part in advancing a just and equitable transition.

GENDER

COP 29 HIGHLIGHTS

DECISION

- COP 29 decided extension of Lima Work Programme on Gender (LWPG) for another 10 years. It also decided to review the implementation of the LWPG during SBI 70 (June 2029) to SBI 71 (November 2029) and provide recommendations for consideration at COP 34 (November 2029).
- It emphasized the urgency of scaled-up support for developing countries to implement and, where applicable, develop Gender Action Plans (GAPs) consistent with relevant provisions of the Convention. The COP requested the SBI 62 to initiate the process of developing a new GAP and provide guidance and recommendation for consideration by COP 30 in 2025.
- It encouraged Parties and relevant public and private entities to support capacity building of the grassroots women's organizations, Indigenous Peoples and local communities with a view to facilitating their simplified access to climate finance for gender mainstreaming.
- It requested the Secretariat to maintain the position of senior gender focal point to support and monitor the implementation of the Enhanced Lima Work Programme on Gender and any subsequent GAP, with annual gender composition report and providing capacity-building support to the constituted bodies and Secretariat staff in integrating a gender perspective into their respective areas of work, etc.

STRATEGIC GAPS AND COMPROMISES

- Some Parties at COP 29 urged the Work Programme to address women in all their diversity, intersectionality, while several others opposed stating that issues such as "women in all their diversity" and "intersectionality' are not related to climate.
- The nexus between gender equality, with its intersectionality, and climate change remained unaddressed at the Baku conference. The COP sidestepped the controversies around gender diversity and took a softer approach, for instance, around inclusion of Indigenous Peoples, local communities and MOI etc.

COP 30 POSITION

- **Ensure adoption of an ambitious, inclusive, transformative and actionable Gender Action Plan with robust financial and technical support:** We urge COP 30 to adopt an ambitious, inclusive, transformative, and actionable Gender Action Plan (GAP) that tackles gendered power relations, dismantles structural barriers, and ensures the full and meaningful participation of women in all their diversity– particularly those from the Global South– alongside persons with disabilities, Indigenous Peoples, youth, children, and civil society as critical stakeholders. The GAP must mainstream gender-responsive approaches across all UNFCCC workstreams, be intersectional and human rights-based, and include strategies to promote positive masculinity through the engagement of men and boys. It must be supported by adequate finance and technical resources, include a robust monitoring and accountability framework with measurable targets and well-defined indicators to enable the Parties to assess gender-responsiveness of climate actions and

implementation progress of the Plan. The GAP must also ensure alignment with the GST outcomes, new NDC cycle, Global Goal on Adaptation, Just Transition, and climate finance and technology frameworks.

- **Deliver gender-related indicators for GGA targets:** COP 30 must ensure that the final set of GGA indicators include gender-specific indicators across all thematic targets and sub targets of the GGA. It must also ensure that there are gender-specific indicators on means of implementation under each thematic target as appropriate and qualitative indicators (flexible but structured) for measuring and tracking the gender responsiveness of adaptation plans, strategies, and actions.
- **Ensure consistent gender disaggregation in the thematic targets:** The final shortlist of the indicators (to be produced at COP 30 for finalization) reflects efforts in incorporating gender-disaggregated data (UNFCCC, 2025i). However, this is not systematic; there is a lack of consistency in the way gender issues are captured; and often lacks specificity. We demand that COP 30 ensure a clear, consistent approach to disaggregation by gender– and other, often intersectional, social factors– across all relevant indicators under all targets of the GGA.
- **Provide clear guidance for the constituted bodies to integrate gender issues in their workstreams:** The latest Synthesis Report by the secretariat on the progress in integrating a gender perspective into constituted body processes reveals that there is still a significant gap in integrating gender into the workstreams of the constituted bodies Gap also remains in reporting the progress made in such integration (UNFCCC, 2025h). We, therefore, urge the COP 30 to providing clear guidance for the constituted bodies on the integrating gender considerations into their work, taking into account the findings and assessments provided by all the synthesis reports published to date. Parties at COP 30 must also ensure these findings are duly considered in developing the new gender action plan.

INDIGENOUS PEOPLES

COP 30 POSITION

- **Ensure free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) and respect for Indigenous Peoples' rights:** Having a close tie with nature and high dependence thereon for their life and livelihoods, Indigenous Peoples are among the groups most vulnerable to the adverse climate change impacts. Their vulnerabilities also stem from the actions, e.g., mitigation, adaptation, to withstand and minimize climate change shocks. We demand that COP 30 deliver a substantive decision text requiring any action– whether around extraction, carbon markets, or energy transitions– to ensure free, prior and informed consent of the Indigenous Peoples, if applicable. Indigenous communities should have the right to approve or reject projects on their territories.
- **Ensure protection and utilization of indigenous knowledge & governance and effective role and contribution of the indigenous and local communities:** The Indigenous Peoples have a range of indigenous practices and knowledge which are proven to be effective nature-based solutions to address climate change in many fronts. They also possess an instinct to save the nature and natural resources making them highly potential for contributing to tackling climate change impacts. As we develop more holistic approaches to climate mitigation and adaptation, Indigenous knowledge systems offer vital insights for sustainable resource management and ecosystem preservation. COP 30 must ensure these indigenous knowledge, practices and voices are not just heard, but are centered in decision-making and climate solutions. We strongly urge Parties at COP 30 to ensure protection of and respect to the traditional knowledge

systems, governance methods, and ways of caring for land of the Indigenous Communities. COP should guide the Parties to ensure their integration into climate, biodiversity, and forest policies– including in Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), NAP, etc., not only as an effort to protect their rights but also to utilize their intellectual properties for addressing climate change and impacts.

- **Provide easy and direct access to grant-based climate finance.** Indigenous Peoples are among the most climate-vulnerable groups and often face multifarious exclusion. Often, poor governance and lack of justice-based allocation of resources within a country, especially the LDCs and developing countries, exclude the Indigenous Peoples from the financing to addressing their needs, aggravating their vulnerability. Protection of their rights are often determined by the national agenda typically designed in a top-down approach. Therefore, COP 30 must deliver a decision establishing Indigenous Peoples' right to directly access to grant-based climate finance with reduced bureaucracy to implement efforts for addressing their climate needs.

YOUTH, CHILDREN, AND PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES

COP 30 POSITION

- **Address distinct vulnerabilities of the youth, children, and persons with disabilities in the climate change policy and planning:** Parties at COP 30 must agree to systematically address the unique risks experienced by the youth, children, and persons with disabilities to climate change across the entire policy cycle– including assessment, planning, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation– of the climate change plans, such as NDC 3.0, NAP, LT-LEDS. In doing so COP 30 should require the Parties to generate and use SADDD (Sex, Age, and Disability Disaggregated Data) as well as youth and children-specific datasets.
- **Operationalize policies, technical assistance and finance to address economic and non-economic loss and damage faced by youth, children, and persons with disabilities:** COP 30 must integrate a perspective on safeguarding the rights of the youth, children, and persons with disabilities in the third review of the WIM, Greater attention should be given to the disproportionate impacts of loss and damage, particularly non-economic losses and displacement, faced by them. Parties at COP 30 must also define pathways to enhance children, youth, and disability-responsive loss and damage finance and technical assistance through the governance, policies, funding and evaluation mechanisms of the Santiago Network and FRLD. COP 30 should ensure their prioritized access to the MOI, and establish dedicated funding windows under the UNFCCC funds with small grant facility and direct access for implementing youth-led projects as well as children, youth, and disability-focused projects on essential services (education, health, water and sanitation, food and nutrition, shock responsive social protection, youth and child protection and early warning systems).
- **Ensure inclusion of youth, children, and persons with disabilities focused indicators under the GGA framework:** We strongly urge the Parties at COP 30 to ensure the final list of indicators for the GGA targets enables the collection and use of disaggregated data that captures the unique risks and adaptation needs of the persons with disabilities, children, and youth (especially for health, nutrition, water and sanitation, adaptive social protection, infrastructure, and education). We further demand that COP 30 ensures incorporation of children, youth, and persons with disabilities-sensitive modalities under the Baku Adaptation Road Map, leveraging available data, tools and resources to facilitate further progress.
- **Ensure inclusivity in the climate negotiation and national planning processes:** We urge the COP 30 to require the Parties, through substantive decision texts, to ensure full and effective inclusion of the youth, children and persons with disabilities, relevant experts and government line ministries in the development, implementation, and monitoring cycle of the national plans such as NDC, NAP, Just Transition Plans, LT-LEDS, etc. The COP 30 must also ensure adequate representation of youth, children and persons with disabilities in all levels of discussions and secure dedicated financial and technical supports for enhancing their capacity to engage and contribute meaningfully in COP negotiations.
- **Recognize persons with disabilities as a formal constituency within UNFCCC:** Absence of formal recognition of disability within COP has been a barrier for the OPDs (representing 1.3 billion people worldwide) to participate in climate negotiations on an equal basis with others, such as in making plenary interventions,

receiving informal advance information from the UNFCCC Secretariat. We urge Parties at COP 30 to agree on a formal constituency represented by persons with disabilities to ensure their full and effective participation in the UNFCCC processes. COP 30 must also ensure their physical accessibility of all the areas at COP and guarantee sign language interpretation and captioning support at all the sessions including plenaries.

- **Deliver a follow-up mandate to the Expert Dialogue on Children and Climate Change:** The expert dialogue on children and climate change, mandated by the outcome of the GST-1 (UNFCCC, 2024d), highlighted the urgent need to integrate children's unique and heightened vulnerabilities, together with their perspectives, into climate policies, actions, and finance. We urge Parties at COP 30 to ensure that the discussions on implementing the GST outcomes take these recommendations into account and establish a foundation for concrete and sustained follow-up actions.
- **Integrate holistic, comprehensive climate education in all levels of compulsory education and establish climate change-focused career guidance and development programs:** Parties at COP 30 must agree to integrate holistic, comprehensive, and inclusive climate education for the youth and children in all levels of mandatory education, befitting each key stage, with local context specificity, and instilling care and respect for nature. The COP 30 must decide to establish a dedicated mechanism to deliver climate-based career guidance, development programs and training, sustainable entrepreneurship, with continued mentorship both in formal and informal sectors. These are very critical to effectively empowering the youth and children in climate action.

HUMAN RIGHTS AND HEALTH

COP 29 HIGHLIGHTS

DECISION

- The human rights considerations in COP discussion and decision have largely remained rhetorical, with minimal progress in creating enforceable mechanisms to hold the Parties accountable. Perceived as a cross-cutting issue of mitigation and adaptation actions, negotiations on human rights protection never gained a primacy in the COP process. With this policy alienation:
- COP 29 asked the Supervisory Body to consider international environmental agreements when working on the Article 6.4 mechanisms, including methodologies, activities involving removals, and the sustainable development tool as proposed by the 14th meeting of the Article 6.4 Supervisory Body (SBM 014).
- COP 29 decided that the final outcome of the UAE–Belém Work Programme should include indicators that capture information pertaining to human rights, besides social inclusion, Indigenous Peoples, gender equality, migrants, children and young people, and persons with disabilities

STRATEGIC GAPS AND COMPROMISES

- Though decisions regarding the NCQG mention the inclusion of vulnerable communities and groups in climate finance efforts, they lack any explicit mention of human rights.

COP 30 POSITION

- **Establish a legal institutional framework under the UNFCCC to protect human rights against climate change impacts:** We strongly urge COP 30 to establish a legal institutional framework under the UNFCCC to safeguard and protect the rights of climate victims, including the climate change-induced migrants and internally displaced persons (IDPs), indigenous peoples, persons with disabilities, gender-based minorities, etc. The framework must align with the existing conventions and covenants on human rights protection and the principles under the UNFCCC and take lessons from the practical experiences of the Human Rights Council (HRC) of the UN.
- **Implement UPR recommendations under climate change theme:** We demand that COP 30 strongly urge Parties to implement the recommendations from the latest Universal Periodic Review of the Human Rights Council on addressing the human rights violation caused by climate change impacts. We further urge COP 30 to require Parties to integrate the UPR recommendations corresponding to their countries in their climate-focused plans and actions.

- **Launch a Work Programme to develop a climate-resilient health surveillance system:** With climate-related health risks soaring, a climate-resilient health surveillance system has become ever more essential. We strongly urge COP 30 to launch a Work Programme to develop climate-resilient health surveillance systems in a country-driven manner combining infrastructure, early warning, data, and capacity-building measures to monitor and respond to climate-related health risks. Such a system must be integrated with the national climate change plans and policies. Alongside, a fast-track access to the national and global climate finance mechanisms must be ensured to implement actions under the system.
- **Mandate global research to understand climate change implications for human rights violation:** We strongly demand that COP 30 commission systemic global research, under the guidance of the Subsidiary Bodies, to understand how climate change impacts catalyzes the existing fault lines of inequality, social exclusions and marginalization of the already marginalized groups and communities, gender discrimination, socio-economic deprivation, etc. and causes human rights violation. The research must specifically include localized, community-specific studies to comprehensively understand differentiated and disproportionate vulnerabilities of climate change impacts on women, Indigenous peoples, and other marginalized communities.
- **Integrate health co-benefit in the national climate policies, with particular attention to addressing disproportionate health burdens and building reproductive health resilience:** COP 30 is expected to launch the Belém Health Action Plan during "Health Day" (Nov 13), stressing climate-resilient health systems across equity and adaptation dimensions (WHO, 2025). We demand that the Action Plan recognize health– both physical and mental– as a core adaptation and mitigation co-benefit and decide to integrate health co- benefits in the national climate change policies. In doing so, COP 30 must particularly take into account the disproportionate health impacts of climate change faced by females and need for reproductive health resilience and menstrual equity. We further urge COP 30 to establish metrics for climate change induced mortality, disease burden, loss of well-being and integrate them with the UNFCCC mechanisms on adaptation (i.e. GGA), loss and damage, and finance to implement health-focused adaptation actions and address climate-induced loss of health and well-being.

DISPLACEMENT AND MIGRATION

COP 29 HIGHLIGHTS

DECISION

- Overshadowed by the politics of L&D negotiation and with no specific outcome of COP decision with regard to addressing climate change-induced displacement and migration, this important agenda remains a cross-cutting issue of adaptation and Loss and Damage negotiation. Given the context, COP 29 decision on several agenda items mentioned about the measures of addressing climate migrants with different meaning and terminologies;
- The NCQG decision mentions inclusion of and extension of climate finance benefits to the vulnerable communities and groups, including to the climate migrants and refugees;
- The COP 29 decided that the Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage (FRLD), agreed at COP28 in 2023, would continue to consider inclusion of "displacement, relocation and migration". It also recognized displaced persons and migrants as beneficiaries of climate funding and encouraged their participation in the design and implementation of supported activities.
- It was also decided that the adaptation and just transition pathways would continue considering issues around displacement, relocation and migration. Developments of the GGA indicators under the UAE-Belem Work Programme were also guided to include displacement and migration.

STRATEGIC GAPS AND COMPROMISES

- While the GGA text in Paragraph 21(d) mentions "migrants," and the NCQG text in paragraph 26 refers to "migrants and refugees," these inclusions are positive but partial.
- The failure to explicitly recognize climate change induced displacement and migration— arguably, the most immediate and severe consequence of climate risks— reflects a critical policy omission. Without this recognition, forcibly migrating populations risk being excluded from protection frameworks and equitable resource allocation, both within national systems and across borders.

COP 30 POSITION

- **Establish a clear and actionable definition of climate change-induced migration and displacement:** COP 30 must task the SBSTA to develop a clear and actionable definition of climate change-induced migration and displacement and sets a clear demarcation between climate-induced migration and displacement and other types of human mobility.
- **Strengthen efforts under WIM to address climate induced human mobility:** We strongly urge COP 30 to significantly strengthen the work under WIM with provision of fast-track grant-based MOI to immediately implement actions to address climate-induced human mobility with guidance from the Subsidiary Bodies and recommendations from the TFD. The new mandate must address causes of displacement and migration, addressing the primary through tertiary consequences– both economic and non-economic– that climate-induced migrants face in the place of origin and in destination. It must also expedite country-driven identification of the causes of non-mobility of the people who cannot escape rather remain exposed to increased risk. WIM should be mandated and resourced to implement location and context-specific efforts for in-situ adaptation for planned relocation in a safe, just, and dignified way where in-situ options are not effective. It must furthermore clearly define how addressing climate-induced displacement and migration is connected with the mandates of existing mechanisms and bodies on adaptation (e.g., GGA framework) and L&Ds (e.g., SNLD, FRLD).
- **Remove ambiguities and debates around the existing terminologies relating to climate induced displacement and migration:** COP 30 must assign the TFD to address the debate on the diverse terminologies of climate change-induced displacees and migrants. The TED should propose measures and actions for addressing the forced climate migration both internal and cross-border, recognizing the rights of the migrants, including their right to seek refuge, and ensuring access to basic services, social protections, etc.
- **Develop a mechanism on collecting data on climate-induced displacement and migration:** A robust data collection system is essential for capturing comparable and longitudinal data of displacement and climate-induced migration to better understand the nexus between climate change and migration and develop a scenario of current and future flows of migration. COP 30 could initially entrust the TFD with this task, with technical support from the SBSTA.

BIODIVERSITY, FOREST, FOOD SYSTEM

COP 30 POSITION

- **Ensure a political outcome to implement the GST-1 commitment to halt and reverse deforestation by 2030:** Taking place in the world's largest tropical forest and reservoir of biodiversity, COP 30 must elevate the issue of halting deforestation to the top of its political agenda to deliver strong and ambitious deforestation commitment. We further demand that forests (and nature) be included in the formal negotiations process. We strongly want a substantive decision text defining a timeline, milestones and a tracking system in the formal outcomes on halting and reversing deforestation and conversion building on the Global Stocktake, the Glasgow Leader's Declaration on Forests and Land Use and other previous commitments.
- **Establish a dedicated funding arrangement for supporting conservation of tropical forests:** The outcome of the first global stocktake notes the need for enhanced support and investment for efforts towards halting and reversing deforestation and forest degradation by 2030, in accordance with Article 5 of the Paris Agreement. The GST-1 emphasizes results- based payments for policy approaches and positive incentives for activities relating to reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation, and the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries (UNFCCC, 2024a, paragraph 34). To this end, we call on all Parties at COP 30 to commit to establishing a global permanent fund, such as the Tropical Forests Forever Fund (TFFF), dedicated to tropical forest conservation.
- **Define the scope and elements of biodiversity under UNFCCC and ensure integration of nature with national and international plans and global frameworks:** GST-1 emphasizes efforts towards halting and reversing deforestation and forest degradation by 2030 and by conserving biodiversity, while ensuring social and environmental safeguards, in line with the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity

Framework (UNFCCC, 2024a, paragraph 33.) However, the scope of integrating the elements of biodiversity conservation into climate change efforts and plan has not been clearly defined. Mindful of this, COP 30 must specify the scope and elements of biodiversity considerable under the UNFCCC negotiation and launch a Work Programme on climate and nature to guide the Parties to develop and communicate a comprehensive list of critical ecosystems to ensure their integration to the national plans. The Work Programme should also guide inclusion of the strategies and efforts towards halting and reversing deforestation and forest degradation and conservation of biodiversity into the national plans such as NAPs, NDCs, NBSAPs, National L&D Framework in light of the Global Biodiversity Framework.

- **Include forests in NDCs**: The Belem COP provides an opportunity for the parties deliver on GST outcome (para 33 and 34 of decision 1/CMA.5) through strengthening forest-related targets and measures in their national climate plans. We demand that COP 30 urge countries to include forest specific emissions reduction targets and highlight actions to implement deforestation- and conversion-free supply chains in their updated NDC-3, and that as mandatory (except for the countries with very limited scope).
- **Incorporate food systems transformation as a central strategy within the UNFCCC framework to effectively halt and reverse deforestation:** Dependency for food is globally a potential cause for deforestation and conversion. COP 30 must urge Parties to better integrate policy measures and actions on food production, consumption and food loss and waste in their updated NDCs after COP 30.
- **Establish synergy of UNFCCC negotiations with CBD negotiations:** The discussions under the UNFCCC have stressed significance of biodiversity both in terms of mitigation and adaptation and the risks thereon imposed by climate change and actions to address it. Complementing to the climate benefits the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) is guiding the Parties from different front for conservation, sustainable use, and equitable share of biodiversity. Therefore, considering the nexus of biodiversity with climate actions and risks, COP 30 must ensure that the decisions on biodiversity under both conventions, i.e., UNFCCC, and CBD, will have a strong synergy from now onwards.

PROCESS OF DEVELOPING THE POSITION PAPER

The position paper titled "30th Conference of the Parties: Articulating CSOs Position Together" represents the collective efforts of the Climate Justice Alliance Bangladesh (CJA-B)–a platform of 44 national and international civil society organizations (CSOs) advocating for climate justice at both national and international levels.

This paper provides a critical, evidence-based analysis of the key issues for negotiation at COP30 and consolidated CSOs' perspectives on the matters of strategic importance for the COP30 negotiations and the future trajectory of global climate policy and ac-tion. The paper aims to offer a strategic overview of climate diplomacy for a diverse group of stakeholders, including policy-makers, CSOs, emerging climate leaders, and the media, thereby supporting the articulation of their positions grounded in human rights and climate justice principles. On a national scale, it is intended to assist the Government of Bangladesh in developing a coherent strategy for COP30. More broadly, the paper aspires to strengthen collective global advocacy efforts to advance the Paris Agreement goal of limiting global warming, while ensuring that climate justice remains central to all climate action.

Development of this position paper followed a participatory process and informed by negotiation narratives, policy documents, and research findings involving:

- Press Conference on gaps between outcomes and expectations from COP 29: The Alliance organized a post-COP29 press event on 27 November 2024 to communicate the shortcomings of COP 29 to a broader audience of policy stakeholders and civil society members. The conference outlined significant unmet expectations and urgent need for accountability and ambitious commitments from the Parties at COP 30, while also raised concerns and opinion on the necessity of immediate, actionable commitments from developed countries.
- A reflection meeting on COP 29 outcomes: The process began with a CSOs discussion on 23 December, 2024 on critical analysis of the outcomes of COP 29, with emphasis on how developed countries have systematically and persistently ignored justice-based principles in climate negotiations. Alliance members gave their critical reflections on pressing issues, which laid the groundwork for articulating clear demands and expectations for SB62 and COP 30.
- CSO Strategy Workshop for formulating CSOs' stance on COP 30 and beyond: The Alliance Members met in a three-day workshop from 30 July to 1 August, 2025 and facilitated discussions among CSOs on critical topics, encompassing climate science, policy, and politics. The workshop culminated in a strategy-framing discussion, where the members collaboratively articulated a unified CSO position on key issues such as mitigation, adaptation, and climate finance.
- A workshop with youth, grassroots CSOs, and media professionals: A two-day workshop was organized during 27-28 September, 2025 with youth climate activists, grassroots CSOs, and journalists in a learning- sharing modality, where the participants produced their demands in the light of local climate change issues, experiences, and needs to be addressed at COP 30 discussion.

ACRONYMS

AFOLU	Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land Use
BAR	Baku Adaptation Roadmap
CBD	Convention on Biological Diversity
CDM	Clean Development Mechanism
CMA	Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement
CMP	Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol
ExCom	Executive Committee
FRLD	Fund for responding to Loss and Damage
GGA	Global Goal on Adaptation
GST	Global Stocktake
HRC	Human Rights Council
IACHR	Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
ICJ	International Court of Justice
IDPs	internally displaced persons
IFIs	International Financial Institutions ILO International Labour Organization's
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INC	Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Framework Convention on Climate Change
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
ITLOS	International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea
LAKI	Lima Adaptation Knowledge Initiative
LDCs	Least Developed Countries
LNG	Liquefied Natural Gas
LT-LEDS	Long-Term Low GHG Emission Development Strategies
MDBs	Multilateral Development Banks
MEL	Monitoring, Evaluation, and Learning
MOI	Means of Implementation
MRV	Measurement, Reporting & Verification
MWP	Mitigation Ambition and Implementation Work Program
NAP	National Adaptation Plan
NBSAP	National Biodiversity Strategies and Action Plans
NCQG	New Collective Quantified Goal
NDC	Nationally Determined Contributions
NWP	Nairobi Work Program
OPD	Organization of the Persons with Disabilities
PAWP	Paris Agreement Work Programme
RMP	Rules, Modalities, and Procedures
SBSTA	Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice
SeSD	Sharm el-Sheikh Dialogue
SIDS	Small Island Developing States
SNLD	Santiago Network on Loss and Damage
TFD	Task Force on Displacement
TFFF	Tropical Forests Forever Fund
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UPR	Universal Periodic Review
WIM	Warsaw International Mechanism
WTO	World Trade Organization

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ARTICULATING CSOs POSITION TOGETHER

EDITOR'S PICK

Under-commitment and under-delivery have placed the world on a dangerous track off from the pathway leading to the Paris Agreement goals. While the first global stocktake indicates the need for deeper emission cuts and stronger action for building resilience, inadequate climate efforts and weak international cooperation have caused the year 2024 to become the warmest year in the 175-year observational record. Many ecosystems have reached their hard limit with many others close to that. Yet again, Parties at COP 29 failed to demonstrate any real progress in expediting political commitment and action for fighting climate change.

On the verge of an existential crisis, we are now warranted to manifold our efforts as the only way to avoid the insurmountable loss. COP 30 offers a rare opportunity for a drastic course correction. Countries must capitalize this by committing ambitious targets for climate actions and supports and agree to deliver on them in an accountable and transparent manner, respecting the historical responsibility.

Climate Justice Alliance Bangladesh